Tag Archives: Groundwater

Changing Cleanup Standards for Leaking USTs

Oct. 26, 2016. In June, the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) released new guidance on remediation of groundwater contamination caused by leaking petroleum underground storage tanks (USTs). The guidance document significantly changes the approach to remediation of  high risk UST sites. Under rules adopted by the Environmental Management Commission (EMC), groundwater contamination at high risk UST sites must be remediated to meet state groundwater quality standards if that is feasible. 15A NCAC 2L.0407(b).

The new guidance directs environmental consultants to assume the cleanup standard for most high risk sites will be  “Gross Contaminant Levels”, which represent contamination at  levels  as much as 1000 X the  groundwater protection or drinking water standards. The guidance raises a number of questions about the impact of more limited cleanup on groundwater and property owners; consistency with EMC rules; and whether the new guidance should have gone through rulemaking  to allow for public comment and adoption by the EMC.

UST Rules. The UST program operates under “risk-based” remediation  rules  that allow less groundwater remediation on sites posing a low risk to public health, safety and the environment and require more extensive remediation on high risk sites.  Existing UST rules require petroleum-contaminated sites to be classified as high, intermediate or low risk based on site conditions and assign a cleanup standard to each risk classification. High risk sites must be remediated to meet the state’s groundwater protection standards to the extent feasible. The groundwater standards set limits  for individual contaminants at the level safe for unrestricted use of the groundwater  — including use as a drinking water supply. Intermediate risk UST sites only have to be remediated to “Gross Contaminant Levels”, which allow contamination at levels as much as 1000 X  the groundwater protection standard or drinking water standard to remain at the end of remediation. Low risk sites may not require any remediation even though contaminant levels  greatly exceed groundwater protection standards.

Under existing rules adopted by the Environmental Management Commission, UST risk classifications are based on a snapshot of conditions around the petroleum release and the likelihood that petroleum contamination will reach water supply wells or create some other imminent health, safety or environmental hazard.  Under  EMC rules (15A NCAC .0406), a UST site is considered “high risk”  if:

(a)  a water supply well… has been contaminated by the release or discharge;
(b)  a drinking water well is located within 1000 feet of the contamination source;
(c)  a water supply well not used for drinking water is located within 250 feet of the source;
(d)  the groundwater within 500 feet of the contamination source could be a future water supply source because there is no other source of water supply;
(e)  the vapors from the discharge or release pose a serious threat of explosion due to accumulation of the vapors in a confined space; or
(f)  the discharge or release poses an imminent danger to public health, public safety, or the environment.

New DEQ guidance on high risk sites. 
North Carolina Petroleum UST Release Corrective Action Phase Project Management: A Calibrated Risk-Based Corrective Action Decision & Implementation Guide, effective June 1, 2016, moves away from the principle of  remediating groundwater at high risk UST sites  to meet state groundwater protection standards.  Instead, the guidance assumes most  sites classified as “high risk” can be remediated only to Gross Contaminant Levels (GCLs).

The guidance document cites data indicating that groundwater contamination plumes contract over time, reducing risk to nearby wells that have not already been contaminated.  Based on state laws directing DEQ to consider factors that limit  risk to nearby wells, DEQ has directed remediation companies to assume older high risk UST sites can be remediated to Gross Contaminant Levels. Under the new guidance, the key factor will be the stability of the contaminant plume. If the plume has stabilized or become sufficiently predictable for DEQ to conclude the contamination does not represent an expanding threat, the cleanup will largely rely on “monitored natural attenuation” of the contamination (natural reduction in contaminant concentrations over time) and the cleanup standard will be based on the GCLs.

A few observations about the new guidance:

♦ The guidance document acknowledges the new remediation guidelines have been driven by a  lack of sufficient state funds to fully remediate even high risk UST sites.

♦ The idea of reviewing high risk classifications based on the age of the site and stability of the plume makes sense, but the new guidance appears to focus on just one risk factor — proximity of the UST’s petroleum release  to existing water supply wells.  The guidance shifts to much more limited cleanup as long as the plume has stabilized and/or alternative water supply is available to well owners affected by petroleum contamination.

The guidance does not appear to consider another factor listed in the Environmental Management Commission’s  risk classification rule — whether groundwater within 500 feet of the UST release may be needed as a future water supply. In areas where groundwater represents the only local water supply source, the EMC risk classification rule intended to protect the groundwater as a potential water supply even in the absence of existing water supply wells.  The new guidance document seems to focus solely on the potential impact to existing wells.

♦  Reliance on GCLs as the final cleanup standard means higher levels of petroleum contamination remain in the groundwater at the completion of remediation. In the absence of extended monitoring, making GCLs the default remediation standard for plumes close to existing water supply wells or in areas where water supply wells may be installed in the future transfers risk from the UST owner to nearby property owners.  UST risk classifications rely on a snapshot of conditions around the petroleum release.  A change in conditions can lower risk (as the guidance document assumes), but conditions can also change in ways that increase risk.  Installation of a new water supply well  or changed  use of an existing well can affect the behavior of the contaminant plume, exposing well users to petroleum contamination.  Given that possibility,  greater monitoring of  high risk sites remediated only to gross contaminant levels may be needed.

♦  Since the guidance document changes implementation of the UST rules,  it likely would be considered a “rule” under the state’s Administrative Procedure Act.  In addition to creating a presumption that  gross contaminant levels will be the cleanup standard for all UST sites — a departure from the existing EMC rule — the guidance document establishes specific triggers for reexamination of an existing site classification. The new DEQ guidance may or may not be good policy, but any policy generally applicable to UST owners and operators would be considered a rule and the Environmental Management Commission has rule-making authority over the UST program. Failure to use the rule-making process also sidesteps any opportunity for comment by UST owners/operators, remediation companies, adjacent property owners or other members of the public on the potential impact of the changes.

♦  The change in UST remediation standards is only the latest step back from protection of groundwater as a water supply resource important to the state’s future.  A significant number of North Carolinians rely on groundwater for water supply either; around 50% of the population drinks water from private water supply wells or well-based water systems. Farms  often rely on water supply wells for irrigation and water supply for animals. In recent years, the direction of state policy has moved consistently toward less remediation of groundwater contamination because of the cost to the state or the cost to the polluter. The question is whether those cost/benefit calculations given enough consideration to the long-term costs of groundwater contamination.

The Ongoing Controversy Over Coal Ash and Well Contamination

August 21, 2016. The controversy over changing state advice to well owners near Duke Energy’s coal ash impoundments has exploded again over conflicting accounts — within the McCrory administration — of the basis for “do not drink” letters sent in 2015 and later withdrawn. Two earlier posts here and here provide background on groundwater and drinking water standards for vanadium and hexavalent chromium (the contaminant of greatest concern).

In 2015, the N.C. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) sent health advisory letters to the owners of wells with concentrations of hexavalent chromium (chromium 6 or Cr-6)  above 0.07 ppb.  The 0.07 ppb threshold represented the concentration of Cr-6 associated with an increased cancer risk of 1:1 million. In early 2016, the McCrory administration rescinded most of the letters and advised well owners that water meeting the federal drinking water standard for total chromium  (100 ppb) should be considered safe to drink. The total chromium standard covers both chromium-3 and the more toxic chromium-6.

Within the last two weeks, the conflict between DHHS and the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) over the content of the health advisory letters  again made headlines. This post describes the roles of  DHHS and DEQ in groundwater contamination incidents; explains the criteria for developing groundwater standards; and makes a few observations on the implications of the conflict for future groundwater contamination incidents.

The role of DHHS in groundwater contamination incidents and development of groundwater standards. When contamination affects drinking water wells,  DHHS toxicologists often advise on the potential health effects. If there is no existing drinking water or groundwater standard for the specific contaminant, the toxicologists use established protocols to assess the contaminant’s short-term  and long-term health effects. Acute health effects include organ damage, skin rashes, respiratory problems and other short to intermediate term problems. Long-term health effects often focus on increased cancer risk. DHHS may also work with the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to develop a health-based groundwater standard for a contaminant that has no existing numeric standard in state or federal rules.  DHHS toxicologists advise rather than regulate. DEQ has responsibility for enforcement of state groundwater standards and oversight for groundwater cleanup.

Cancer risk as a factor in setting groundwater standards and assessing groundwater contamination.  Both state and federal environmental agencies consider increased  cancer risk as a factor in assessing groundwater contamination and setting goals for groundwater cleanup.  North Carolina’s  groundwater rules list a  1:1 million increased cancer risk as a primary criteria for setting groundwater quality standards.  In 15A NCAC 2L.0202(d),  the rules require a state groundwater standard to be based on the lesser  of  the

(1)  Systemic threshold concentration calculated as follows: [Reference Dose (mg/kg/day) x 70 kg (adult body weight) x Relative Source Contribution (.10 for inorganics; .20 for organics)] / [2 liters/day (avg. water consumption)];

(2)  Concentration which corresponds to an incremental lifetime cancer risk of 1×10-6;

(3)  Taste threshold limit value;

(4)  Odor threshold limit value;

(5)  Maximum contaminant level[the federal drinking water standard]; or

(6)  National secondary drinking water standard.

Based on recent public statements by DHHS scientists, DHHS and DEQ staff in the Division of Waste Management calculated increased cancer risk associated with Cr-6 exposure using a standard protocol. The two agencies concluded that  0.07 ppb represented the break-point for the 1:1 million increased cancer risk.  The  DEQ/DHHS calculation of increased cancer risk associated with > 0.07 ppb of  Cr-6  then became the basis for  “do not drink” letters sent to well owners in 2015.

Health advisories based on groundwater contamination. DHHS has long worked with DEQ staff  to  advise well owners on health risks associated with groundwater contamination. Both DHHS and DEQ report to the Governor, creating  a strong incentive for the agencies to agree on assessment of public health risk.  Environmental and public health experts may debate  the appropriate standard for a contaminant,  but  public conflict between the two agencies is  extremely unusual and may be unprecedented.

The split between DHHS and DEQ over advice to well owners.  According to DHHS scientists, the 0.07 ppb standard for CR-6 based on increased cancer risk reflected the consensus of DHHS public health experts and staff in DEQ’s Division of Waste Management.  DEQ leaders, however, encouraged DHHS to advise well owners that water exceeding the 0.07 standard should still be considered safe to drink as long as Cr-6 levels did not exceed the federal drinking water standard of 100 ppb.  DEQ publicly raised  concerns about the DHHS health advisories  in a January 2016 presentation to a legislative committee. The presentation compared the 0.07 ppb standard  to the federal drinking water standard and to standards adopted by other states.  Within a month after the legislative presentation,  DEQ and DHHS sent new letters advising well owners that well water with Cr-6 levels below 100 ppb should be considered safe to drink because the water meets federal drinking water standards.  Recent  statements by state toxicologist Ken Rudo and state epidemiologist Megan Davies (who has resigned over the issue) make it clear that DHHS public health experts did not believe the existing state and federal standards for total chromium sufficiently protected human health and objected to the revised letters.  The 100 ppb standard for total chromium represents an increased cancer risk orders of magnitude higher than the 0.07 ppb standard — 1:700 increased risk of cancer versus  1:1 million increased risk.

Some observations:

♦   The state’s groundwater standard remains 10 ppb for total chromium and the Coal Ash Management Act of 2014 directs DEQ to use state groundwater standards in assessing drinking water wells around coal ash impoundments.  DEQ  has not  proposed a specific state groundwater standard for Cr-6 based on the DEQ/DHHS cancer risk calculation. As a result, the 0.07 ppb standard remains a health advisory rather than an enforceable groundwater standard. The federal drinking water standard of 100 ppb does not apply to either groundwater assessment or evaluation of well safety near coal ash impoundments.

♦  According to Secretary Donald van der Vaart, DEQ does not question the DHHS calculation of increased cancer risk associated with Cr-6.   Given the gap between the total chromium standard of 10 ppb and the 0.07 ppb threshold for a 1:1 million increased cancer risk associated with chromium-6,  the  total chromium standard does not meet a basic criteria for a N.C. groundwater standards — which requires a groundwater standard to be based on the 1:1 million increased cancer risk —  and should be reviewed.

♦ State and federal agencies routinely use the  1:1 million increased cancer risk as a criteria  for developing health-based standards for permitting  and to set environmental remediation goals.  Both state and federal programs also recognize that there may be a need to move off the 1:1million cancer risk criteria in individual cases because it is not technically or economically feasible to meet the standard.  In those instances, the agency can adjust a groundwater cleanup goal  (for example) to reflect the limits of available technology.

Going forward.  As a practical matter, the difference between the DHHS health-based standard and the state groundwater standard has no direct enforcement consequences for Duke Energy. For the time being, the applicable state groundwater standard continues to be the total chromium standard of 10 ppb.  Under 2016 amendments to Coal Ash Management Act,  Duke Energy must  provide a permanent alternative water supply to all well owners within 1/2 miles of a coal ash pond which makes both the  cancer risk  threshold and the state groundwater standard irrelevant to decisions about alternative water supply.

Assuming no change in the state groundwater standard, the 10 ppb total chromium standard will also drive development and approval of  groundwater remediation plans for areas surrounding the coal ash impoundments.

The cancer risk threshold for Cr-6  does raise questions about the adequacy of the state’s  total chromium standard.  The DHHS calculation of cancer risk suggests the  existing total chromium does not meet one of the basic criteria for state groundwater standards — protection against a 1:1 million increase in cancer risk.

The public conflict between DEQ and DHHS raises two other questions —

Should  state environmental and public health agencies inform citizens  of the health risk  associated with contamination that meets existing regulatory standards? DHHS public health officials felt an obligation to inform well owners of the higher cancer risk potentially associated with elevated levels of CR-6; DEQ took the position that the warnings were unnecessarily alarming if the well water met federal drinking water standards.

The other question is more technical and would inevitably come up in any reevaluation of the groundwater standard for chromium: Is there any economic or technical reason not to use the more stringent 0.07 ppb standard as the basis for assessing risk of human exposure to Cr-6 in groundwater and setting groundwater remediation goals?  The choice of a standard has implications  beyond the immediate controversy over coal ash impoundments and so far there has not been a practical critique of the 0.07 ppb threshold based on technology or cost.  The reason behind DEQ’s objection to the DHHS 0.07 ppb threshold as a basis for health advisories still isn’t entirely clear since it appears most  public water systems  in the state meet the DHHS health-based standard. Those that don’t meet the 0.07 ppb standard come much closer than a number of the wells  DEQ argued should be considered safe because the water meets the federal drinking water standard of 100 ppb.

Fact-Checking the History of Coal Ash Regulation in N.C.

July 27, 2016. Misunderstanding history makes it more likely  the same mistakes will be made again. In that spirit, a fact-check of recent DEQ statements1 about the history of coal ash regulation in North Carolina:

“In 2007, a previous administration changed landfill laws and specifically exempted coal-ash ponds from many environmental requirements.”

The statement seems to be referring to the Solid Waste Management Act of 2007 which amended landfill siting and construction standards.  Two provisions related to coal ash landfills, but nothing in the law directly addressed coal ash ponds. Coal ash was not the main focus of the 2007 law, which responded to several controversial applications to construct new landfills for household waste and construction debris. As a result, the law  focused on concerns specific to those  proposals — impacts on wildlife refuges and parks; the size and height of waste disposal areas; separation from groundwater; and guarantees the landfill owner could pay for  environmental remediation.

The first of two provisions in the 2007 law affecting coal ash allowed utilities to construct a lined coal ash landfill on top of an old coal ash disposal site under specific standards. The second provision exempted coal ash landfills on the site of a coal-fired power plant from some of the new landfill siting requirements.   Coal ash landfills located on power plant sites continued to be regulated as industrial landfills under standards that required liners;  groundwater monitoring; and setbacks from waters and wetlands. The Department of Environment of Environment and Natural Resources (“DENR”) did not request either coal ash provision.

“In 2009, the state exempted Duke Energy from having to show that its coal-ash ponds were structurally sound. If that information had been required, the corroded pipe under the Dan River coal ash pond might have been found and the spill avoided.”

In 2009, the General Assembly actually repealed a state Dam Safety Act exemption for coal ash impoundments. See Session Law 2009-390.   Before 2009,  coal ash ponds had been entirely exempt from the dam safety law.  Repeal of the exemption made coal ash impoundments subject to the dam safety law  for the first time — requiring compliance with dam safety standards; regular state inspections; and DENR review/approval of plans for expansion or repair.

DEQ’s statement may be focused on language in the 2009 legislation that allowed existing coal ash impoundments to “… be deemed to have received all of the necessary approvals  from [DENR]  and the Commission for Dam Safety for normal operation and maintenance”. In effect, the law allowed impoundments built before repeal of the exemption to continue to operate as if the state had permitted the original construction.  Those impoundments, however, would be inspected going forward and required to comply with dam safety orders to address structural deficiencies.  On balance, the 2009 legislation greatly increased rather than diminished state oversight of coal ash impoundments under the Dam Safety Act.

The Dam Safety Act amendments did not cause state and federal regulators to miss critical information about the Dan River stormwater pipe that later ruptured. Both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and DENR dam safety staff became aware of the stormwater pipes at the Dan River impoundment in 2009-2010. Before inspecting N.C. impoundments as part of the federal response to the TVA coal ash disaster,  EPA asked electric utilities to provide information on  structural conditions at each impoundment site in the state. Maps of the Dan River site that Duke Energy provided to state and federal inspectors incorrectly identified the stormwater pipes as concrete rather than corrugated metal.   The error meant state and federal inspectors did not have complete and accurate information as background for the inspections,  but not because the 2009 law allowed electric utilities to shield information about the impoundments — it didn’t.

Note:  It later became clear that internal Duke Energy inspection reports had flagged the metal pipes at Dan River for attention as early as the 1980s. In accepting a plea deal to a large federal penalty for the Dan River spill,  Duke Energy acknowledged a pattern of neglect that included failure to take the advice of its own engineers in 2011 and 2012 to do camera inspections of the stormwater pipes.

“In 2010 federal regulators required leaks from all coal ash ponds to be evaluated. No action was taken in North Carolina for three years.” 

By 2010,  EPA  had taken several steps to get a better handle on coal ash impoundments. In 2009, EPA  launched the nationwide effort to assess the structural integrity of coal ash impoundments.   Based on information provided by the electric utilities, EPA did on-site inspections of  eight higher risk  N.C. impoundment sites in 2009-2010 including the Dan River facility.  Inspectors from the state’s water quality, waste management and dam safety programs accompanied EPA on most of those inspections.  Also in 2009-2010, state dam safety inspectors did an initial dam safety inspection of every coal ash impoundment as the first step in bringing those impoundments under the Dam Safety Act.

On a different track, EPA  provided new guidance to states on permitting  discharges  from coal ash impoundments under the Clean Water Act ; the new guidance recognized that  discharges could result from seeps and leaks through impoundment walls.  In 2010-2012, the state water quality program began increasing  groundwater monitoring requirements for coal ash ponds and  revising stormwater permits for impoundment sites. It may be that state programs gave higher priority to  structural impoundment problems, groundwater contamination and stormwater permitting in 2010-2012 and lower priority to  addressing the water quality impacts of leaks. It is difficult to know without more information.

“In 2011 the state gave Duke Energy approval to use Sutton lake, a recreational area in Wilmington, as a dumping ground for coal ash.” 

Sutton Lake has not been used for coal ash disposal. Coal ash from the Sutton Power Plant went into one of two coal ash impoundments;  outlets release water from the impoundments to Sutton Lake. Another outlet releases water from Sutton Lake to the Cape Fear River.  The earliest Clean Water Act permit for the Sutton Plant accessible on the DEQ  website (from 1996)  treated the outlet to the Cape Fear River as the permitted discharge point and applied effluent standards there. Although the permit also put water quality limits on discharges from the coal ash impoundments to Sutton Lake, the lake was regulated as a cooling pond — part of the wastewater treatment system — rather than as “waters of the State” protected under the Clean Water Act.  Every renewal of the 5-year Clean Water Act permit from 1996 through  2011 continued that approach. Apparently water quality staff revisited the question of whether Sutton Lake should be treated as a cooling pond or as “waters of the State”  in  2011, but decided to maintain the approach used in earlier permit renewals. In 2014, the department (now the Department of Environmental Quality) looked at the issue again and concluded — correctly, I think — that the permit should be modified to treat Sutton Lake as “waters of the State” and put effluent limits on discharges to the lake. It isn’t clear why the water quality program and the Environmental Management Commission reached a different conclusion in issuing and renewing earlier permits.

“For many years Duke Energy monitored the water under its ponds and found hundreds of samples that did not meet groundwater standards. Again, no action was taken. In fact, the prior administration created a policy instructing regulators not to fine Duke if the company said it would correct the problem.”

The state water quality program  first began requiring comprehensive groundwater monitoring for coal ash constituents in 2009-2010, imposing new groundwater monitoring conditions as Clean Water Act discharge permits for the impoundments came up for renewal.  The new conditions covered key contaminants associated with coal ash and required groundwater monitoring to be done under a state-approved plan to insure monitoring wells would be appropriately placed to detect violations.  Given the  time required to install monitoring wells and collect a full cycle of monitoring results, little data  showing a  groundwater standard violation related to coal ash would have been available before 2010.  None of the groundwater violations cited in DEQ’s  2014 enforcement action concerning the Sutton Power Plant predate 2009;  most come from the period between 2010 and 2014.

Before 2009-2010, most of the state’s coal ash impoundments operated without significant groundwater monitoring for decades.  Electric utilities built many of the impoundments in the 1960s and 1970s  before any environmental regulations applied.  In the late 1970s,  the state began issuing federal Clean Water Act permits for discharges from the impoundments to rivers, lakes and streams. Environmental regulation focused on the quality of water discharged from the upper layers of the ash ponds to surface waters rather than the coal ash itself.  In the 1980s-1990s, the state began putting  groundwater monitoring conditions on the discharge permits, but the monitoring focused on very basic parameters. For the Sutton Plant,  those parameters were:   water level,  pH, chlorides, iron, arsenic, selenium and total suspended solids. Groundwater concerns had not yet focused on contaminants specifically associated with coal ash.

Groundwater concerns increased after 2000 as EPA continued to lay the groundwork for a federal coal ash disposal rule. In 2006, electric utilities began voluntarily  monitoring for contaminants associated with coal ash in the face of pressure from environmental organizations and expected federal rulemaking.  Most of the data from the voluntary monitoring could not be used in state enforcement actions.  Under state groundwater rules, a violation exists only if the impoundment causes an exceedence of groundwater standards at or beyond a compliance boundary around the pond.  (For most N.C.  impoundments, the compliance boundary is set 500 feet from the edge of the pond.)  Wells used by the utilities for the voluntary groundwater monitoring had not been placed to document groundwater standard violations at the compliance boundary.  But based on the voluntary monitoring results,  the state water quality program  put broader groundwater monitoring conditions on impoundment permits and required monitoring to be done under a state-approved well-siting plan to insure the data could be used for future enforcement.

The enforcement policy mentioned in the DEQ statement refers to 2010 groundwater enforcement guidance developed by water quality staff.  Since the expanded groundwater monitoring requirements applied to facilities that had operated for many years without monitoring, the water quality program developed a policy that put the enforcement emphasis on remediation of contamination rather than assessment of penalties for activities that had been unregulated  or lightly regulated for much of the facility’s history.

What the fact-checked history suggests:

It is difficult to contain environmental impacts 20 to 40 years after the fact. Both state and federal regulators struggled to understand and address problems associated with a method of coal ash disposal electric utilities had already invested in and become reliant on by the time environmental impacts became a concern.

The basic arc of state and federal regulation looks like this: In the 1970s,  state and federal regulators focused on discharges from existing coal ash ponds to surface waters. There was a quiet period between issuance of the first Clean Water Act discharge permits for coal ash impoundments in the late 1970s through the 1990s.  Regulators assumed the electric utilities were maintaining the impoundments properly and indicators of  groundwater contamination associated with coal ash had not reached critical mass. EPA began working on a federal coal ash disposal rule in the late 1990s, but abandoned the proposed rule in 2000 in the face of strong political opposition. Between 2000 and 2008, troubling data on groundwater and surface water pollution associated with coal ash ponds accumulated and the 2008 TVA spill undermined confidence in the electric utilities’ maintenance of impoundments.  Both state and federal regulatory efforts accelerated in 2008-2009, leading to state permitting changes and renewed efforts to adopt a federal coal ash disposal rule. (EPA finalized the federal rule in 2015.)

The issues surrounding coal ash have not been the responsibility of any one administration or a single branch of government. The history spans multiple governors of both political parties and legislative as well as executive action.  Coal ash provisions in the 2007 Solid Waste Management Act came out of direct negotiation between the electric utilities and legislators.  In  2009, the General Assembly repealed the Dam Safety Act exemption for coal ash impoundments,  but did not move a bill to set comprehensive state standards for coal ash disposal out of committee.

Leaps in state law on coal ash  management followed specific crises — the coal ash impoundment exemption from the Dam Safety Act survived until the 2008 TVA spill put a spotlight on poor maintenance. In  2009, the  General Assembly had no interest in moving comprehensive coal ash disposal legislation; that only changed after the 2014 Dan River coal ash spill .

By 2009, accumulating evidence of groundwater contamination and other water quality concerns led the state water quality program to use existing permitting authority to require more groundwater monitoring around coal ash impoundments and increase stormwater requirements. Those  efforts to use existing permitting tools more effectively laid the foundation for later groundwater enforcement actions.

 

 1 The statements  in bold appeared in  a recent letter by DEQ Assistant Secretary Tom Reeder to the Raleigh News and Observer.

Coal Ash, Contaminated Wells and Providing a Safe Drinking Water Supply

May 31, 2016. The previous post  discussed legislative efforts to resolve the separation of powers conflict still hovering over implementation of the 2014 Coal Ash Management Act. The same piece of legislation, Senate Bill 71,  also attempts to fix other problems that have developed around coal ash cleanup efforts. One of the most significant changes in Senate Bill 71 responds to concerns about contaminated drinking water wells near coal ash ponds.  The final version of Senate Bill 71 approved today by both the House and Senate gives more well owners the certainty of an alternative water supply.  A comparison of Senate Bill 71 to the original Coal Ash Management Act below.

2014 Coal Ash Management Act:

Guaranteed an alternative water supply only to well owners located within 1/2 mile and down-gradient of the coal ash impoundment.  Well testing and groundwater assessment done around the impoundments since 2014  have detected high levels of one or more contaminants associated with coal ash, including hexavalent chromium, in wells located up-gradient or side-gradient of the impoundments. Although groundwater usually follows surface topography, the  underlying geology and human activity can alter the direction of  flow. The alternative water supply provision in the Coal Ash Management Act did not apply to those wells.

♦   The requirement for Duke Energy to provide an alternative water supply was contingent on well sampling showing a contaminant associated with coal ash above the level allowed under state groundwater standards.  The  lack  of a state groundwater standard for some contaminants  (including venadium and hexavalent chromium) led to confusion, conflicting advice to well owners,  and lack of clarity on the standard DEQ would use to require Duke Energy to provide an alternative water source.  For background on the controversy over the groundwater standards see an earlier post here . Many well owners have received bottled water for months because of documented well contamination, but remain uncertain whether DEQ will require Duke Energy to provide a permanent alternative water supply.

♦  The provision on alternate water supply enacted in 2014, G.S. 130A-309.209(c), did not specifically require a permanent solution — such as connection to a public water system — rather than bottled water.

♦ Under the 2014 law, owners of contaminated wells located up-gradient and side-gradient of a coal ash impoundment might receive alternate supplies under the state’s groundwater corrective action rules,.  The rules (referenced in the 2014 Coal Ash Management Act) apply to all groundwater contamination incidents and require a company responsible for groundwater contamination to address health risks created by the contamination.  The  corrective action rules,  however, only apply to a person/company shown to be 1. responsible for contamination that 2. exceeds state groundwater standards. Two years after enactment of the Coal Ash Management Act,  controversy surrounds the standards for some contaminants and groundwater studies have not yet been sufficient to determine whether the coal ash ponds  caused contamination found  in up-gradient and side-gradient wells.

Senate Bill 71:

♦ Requires Duke Energy to provide an alternative water supply to the owner of every well located within 1/2 mile of the compliance boundary surrounding a coal ash pond. (The compliance boundary — either 250 feet or 500 feet from the edge of the impoundment depending on its age — is the point at which exceedance of a state  groundwater standard would be a violation.)

♦  For wells within 1/2 mile of the compliance boundary around an ash pond, alternative water supply would be required without regard to the location of the well in relation to the impoundment (down-gradient, up-gradient or side-gradient) or demonstration of a groundwater standard violation.

♦ The bill also requires Duke Energy to provide alternative water supply to well owners located outside the 1/2 mile perimeter, but located in an area at risk  of contamination because of the projected migration of groundwater contamination.

♦ The bill expressly requires Duke Energy to provide a permanent alternative water supply source and creates a preference for connection to a public water system.  The bill allows  installation of a filtration system instead if extension of a water line would be cost-prohibitive. The State Water Infrastructure Authority would review Duke Energy’s alternative water supply plan for each impoundment site and make the final decision on the type of permanent water supply.

Several things are notable about the Senate Bill 71 approach.   First, the bill  provides  certainty to well owners  that would not have been possible as clearly or as quickly any other way.  But the bill is also a reminder that property owners affected by groundwater contamination from other sources have a longer, more difficult and less certain road to a safe drinking water supply.

A Proposal: Insure owners of wells near coal ash sites aren’t exposed to greater health risks as a result

April 18, 2016. An earlier post discussed the confusion over “do not drink” advisories issued — and later withdrawn —  for  a number of wells near coal ash sites.  There continues to be confusion among legislators, state agencies and the public about the correct response to high levels of hexavalent chromium (Cr-6) and vanadium in drinking water wells near coal ash impoundments. This post attempts to  clarify some misconceptions and offers a proposal.

First, a clarification about individual contaminant standards.  Some legislators understood presentations by the  Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)  to mean that there are multiple, inconsistent standards for a contaminant. In fact,  the state uses one standard for each contaminant to determine health risk and require groundwater remediation. But as the earlier post explained, the standard may come from Safe Drinking Water Act standards  or state groundwater rules.  Drinking water standards address a narrow set of contaminants  likely to be found in public water systems; groundwater standards  cover a broader range of extremely hazardous substances that may become a health threat because of a specific pollution incident.

State groundwater rules list health-based concentration limits for many hazardous substances, but also recognize that a pollution incident may involve a contaminant that does not yet have a groundwater standard.  For those contaminants, the rules set the default standard at “non-detect” —  any detectable concentration of the contaminant would be a violation. But the rules also create a process for setting  an interim groundwater standard that would allow concentrations above detection levels based on an evaluation of health risk.  DHHS used that process  to develop the interim standards for vanadium and hexavalent chromium (CR-6) that  led to  “do not drink” advisories for  a number of wells near coal ash facilities.

Gaps in the changing state response.  DEQ and DHHS offered a two-part explanation for withdrawal of the “do not drink” letters. The two points and some additional context for each:

  1. Levels of vanadium and Cr-6 in the wells do not violate state or federal drinking water rules.  Since there is no drinking water standard for either vanadium or Cr-6, this is true as far as it goes.  But the lack of a drinking water standard does not imply safety.  State and federal agencies have never relied solely on drinking water standards to make decisions about mitigation of health risks at contaminated sites  because drinking water standards do not cover many extremely hazardous substances.  That is why the process for asking DHHS to set interim state groundwater standards  exists. The question should be whether concentrations of vanadium and Cr-6  in the wells represent a significant additional health risk that can be minimized by either providing an alternative water source or remediating the groundwater.
  2. A number of large N.C. public water systems also do not meet the DHHS interim standards for vanadium and Cr-6.  The implication has been that the well water is as safe as water supplied to customers of public water systems.  In recent weeks, media and public interest organizations have looked more closely at the levels of vanadium and Cr-6 in public water systems as compared to the wells near coal ash facilities.   Although some N.C. water systems exceed the DHHS interim standards for vanadium or hexavalent chromium, most  water systems appear to meet the DHHS standards. A WRAL news story includes a chart showing both maximum and average concentrations of Cr-6 in public water systems across the state here.  DHHS set the interim standard for Cr-6 at 0.07 parts per billion, representing a 1:1 million cancer risk over a lifetime. WRAL’s analysis found that only about one-third of N.C.’s public water systems have average concentrations of Cr-6 exceeding 0.07 ppb.  More importantly, those public water systems come much closer to meeting the  DHHS standard than a number of the tested wells. The public water systems with the highest average concentrations of Cr-6 had concentrations less than half that of some wells tested near Buck Steam Station.

A proposal:  Issuance of health advisories and steps to provide alternative water supply to well owners should be based on comparative health risk.

The discussion of health advisories issued to well owners around coal ash sites has become focused on whether  public water systems meet the DHHS recommended standards for vanadium and Cr-6.  That is the wrong question. Many (most) North Carolina water systems meet the DHHS standards;  those that do not still provide water that is safer than water in a number of the tested wells. Environmental remediation programs exist in part to reduce  health risks created by a pollution incident.  To the extent well owners will be exposed to greater health risk as a result of groundwater contamination, the additional risk should be eliminated or minimized to the extent possible.  The question is not whether all public water systems meet the DHHS standards. The question is whether groundwater pollution has exposed these well owners to greater health risk — and one way to answer that question is to compare contaminant levels in the well water to the nearest public water system. If the public water system provides water with lower contaminant concentrations that translate into lower additional cancer risk and less risk of acute toxicity, the well owner should be provided with advice on the higher risk of drinking the well water.  And any person responsible for the contamination should be required to provide an alternative water source.

To Drink or Not to Drink: A Change in Advice for Well Owners


March 17, 2016. In 2015,  the N.C. Division of Public Health (Department of Health and Human Services) sent letters advising the owners of  369  wells located near coal ash ponds not to drink their well water because of elevated levels of vanadium and chromium-6.  Last week, the Division of Public Health sent letters to those same well owners to withdraw the “do not drink” advisory.  Some questions and answers on the conflicting advice below.

What are vanadium and chromium-6 (Cr-6)? Both elements occur naturally in the environment and can be found in coal ash. Both may  be concentrated in the air or in groundwater as a result of industrial activities.  Inhalation of Cr-6 (or hexavalent chromium) has been associated with increased risk of lung cancer. In 2010,  the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency  began a new health study to determine whether ingestion of  Cr-6  in drinking water increases other types of cancer risk. The Erin Brokovitch story of hexavalent chromium contamination in the town of Hinkley, California raised public awareness of Cr-6 as a public health issue. In Hinkley, Pacific Gas & Electric  had used Cr-6 as an additive in cooling water for a natural gas compression station. The  Cr-6 percolated into groundwater from unlined ponds used to store the cooling water, contaminating the town’s drinking water supply. (Levels of Cr-6 in  Hinkley’s groundwater were exponentially higher than concentrations found  in North Carolina  wells.)

Are there drinking water standards for vanadium and  Cr-6? There is no federal drinking water standard for vanadium.   The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has adopted a drinking water standard for total chromium of 100 parts per billion (ppb);  the standard covers combined concentrations of chromium-3 (a nutritional element found in plant material) and chromium-6.  Water systems required to meet federal Safe Drinking Water Act standards monitor  total chromium levels, but not necessarily  Cr-6. Nationally, only the State of California  has adopted a specific drinking water standard for Cr-6. In 2014, after  years of  study prompted by the Hinkley contamination,  California adopted a standard of 10 parts per billion for Cr-6 in drinking water — 1/10th the concentration allowed under the federal drinking water standard for total chromium.

How are  N.C. groundwater standards different from  federal drinking water standards?  In part,  the two sets of standards serve different purposes. Drinking water standards adopted by U.S. EPA under the Safe Drinking Water Act only apply to the treated water that public water systems  provide to their customers.  Under the law, “public water system” means any system providing water to 15 or  more connections or to 25 or more people whether the system is  operated by a local government or a for-profit water utility.  Federal drinking water standards do not apply to privately owned water supply wells serving individual homes or businesses.

N.C.’s  groundwater standards are used to identify unsafe levels of groundwater contamination;  set goals for groundwater remediation; and advise well owners on use of water from affected wells.  Most N.C. groundwater standards track the federal drinking water standard for the same contaminant, but in a few cases the state has adopted a more stringent groundwater standard or has adopted a groundwater standard for a contaminant that has no corresponding drinking water standard.  Leading up to the well testing around coal ash ponds, N.C. had no groundwater standard for vanadium and no specific standard for Cr-6. although the state had a groundwater standard of 10 ppb for total chromium (more stringent that the 100 ppb drinking water standard for total chromium.)

How does N.C. set groundwater standards?  The N.C. Environmental Management Commission has adopted state groundwater standards as rules. Since existing groundwater standards may not address every potential contaminant,  the rules also create a process for developing  a temporary  standard  — an Interim Maximum Allowable Concentration or “IMAC” —  to address an unregulated contaminant.  Epidemiologists in the N.C. Division of Public Health generally develop a recommended IMAC based on review of human health effects such as toxicity and increased cancer risk.

Why did the  Division of Public Health send “do not drink” letters in 2015 based on  vanadium and chromium-6?   Since no state groundwater standard or federal drinking water standards existed for vanadium and  Cr-6, DEQ  asked the Division of Public Health to develop interim groundwater standards (the IMACs described above)  to be used in assessing wells around the coal ash ponds. Division of Public Health calculated a standard of 0.07 ppb for Cr-6 and 0.3 ppb for vanadium.  In each case, the deciding factor was the concentration associated with an  incremental increase in cancer risk. The table below shows the IMAC standard compared to the federal Safe Drinking Water Act standard and the N.C. groundwater standard.

Contaminant Fed. Drinking Water Standard N.C. Groundwater Standard IMAC
Vandadium No standard No standard 0.3 ppb
C.hromium-6 None –Total Cr 100 ppb None – Total Cr 10 ppb 0.07 ppb

Why did Division of Public Health withdraw the “do not drink” letters?  None of the  well owners who received “do not drink” letters  based solely on the vanadium and Cr-6 IMAC standards have well water that would violate Safe Drinking Water Act standards for a public water system.  DEQ has reported that 70% of public water systems in the U.S. exceed the IMAC standards set by Division of Public Health, including several large public water systems in North Carolina. (The information, provided in a report to the legislature’s Environmental Review Commission,  did not indicate how many of those systems exceeded the IMAC standard for vanadium versus Cr-6. You can find the entire DEQ presentation to the Commission  here.)

The gap between the IMAC standards and Safe Drinking Water Act standards meant that well  owners were being advised not to drink water that meets current drinking water standards and could lawfully be provided to customers of a  public water system.   As a practical matter, that also  means the well owners may not have access to an alternative water supply of any better quality  since  the nearest public water system also may not meet the IMAC standards.

None of this  means the analysis done by the Division of Public Health in developing the IMACs was wrong. Environmental and public health standards change with additional knowledge; the fact that the U.S. Environmental Protection has undertaken a new health study of Cr-6 in particular suggests some question about the adequacy of the  federal drinking water standard based solely on total chromium.  The standards adopted by EPA and the states also sometimes involve compromise between the most protective health-based standard and the practicalities (and cost) of meeting that standard.

Making Sense of a Coal Ash Penalty

March 8, 2016.   The  civil penalty for  groundwater violations around Duke Energy’s Sutton Plant in New Hanover County has taken several unprecedented  twists and turns.  This post looks at the  $25 million civil penalty for groundwater contamination at the Sutton Plant that became a $7 million civil penalty for groundwater violations at all 14 coal ash sites in the state and then a $7 million civil penalty just for the Sutton violations.

Groundwater Enforcement 101.   The Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) can order remediation of groundwater contamination and assess civil penalties for violation of the state’s  health-based groundwater standards.  Some contaminants (like arsenic) occur naturally; if natural  “background” levels of the contaminant exceed the state standard, the background level becomes the standard. State rules allow for some exceedence of  groundwater standards within the footprint of a waste disposal facility, but set a “compliance boundary” around the facility where the  standards must be met.  Coal ash ponds permitted before 1983 must meet groundwater standards within 500 feet of the ash pond; those  permitted later have a  250-foot compliance boundary.

To assess a civil penalty for coal ash contamination,  DEQ  must show: 1. Contaminants in the groundwater exceed the state standard (which may require determining background levels if the contaminant occurs naturally); 2. Exceedences occur at or beyond the compliance boundary; and 3. Coal ash  caused or contributed to the contamination. State law caps the maximum penalty for a single groundwater violation  at  $25,000.  In setting the specific penalty amount within the cap, DEQ considers a number of penalty factors including the extent of environmental harm;  whether the violation was intentional; and any compliance costs the violator may have avoided.  Since  DEQ can assess daily penalties for continuing violations, the total civil penalty may exceed $25,000  if a violation continues over a period of time.

Now a Little Coal Ash History. The state originally permitted  coal ash ponds as wastewater treatment systems. The ponds receive, treat and discharge  process wastewater and sometimes stormwater.  A coal ash pond functions like  the  settling basins used  in other wastewater treatment systems; the coal ash settles out of the  wastewater slurry,  reducing pollutants in the top layer of pond water.  The utility then discharges wastewater  from the top of the pond to a river, stream or lake under a  Clean Water Act Permit —  the  National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (or “NPDES”)  permit.  NPDES permits  protect surface water from pollution; since groundwater was never the focus, the  permits  historically required very limited groundwater monitoring around coal ash ponds.

In response to pressure for national coal ash disposal standards,  companies operating coal-fired power plants began a program of voluntary groundwater monitoring in 2006 and provided results to the state.   (As a voluntary program, the power companies alone decided what contaminants to monitor for and where to put monitoring wells.) By  2009,  state water quality officials had become so concerned about the utilities’ groundwater data  that the Division of Water Quality  (DWQ) moved  to put stronger  groundwater monitoring conditions on NPDES permits for coal ash ponds as the permits came up for renewal.  The new permit conditions made monitoring for specific contaminants mandatory and required  DWQ approval of the monitoring plan so monitoring wells would be appropriately placed to identify violations at the compliance boundary.

As DWQ began adding monitoring conditions to permits,  the senior manager in DWQ’s groundwater protection program issued a  memo  explaining how the program would take enforcement actions based on the new groundwater monitoring data. The memo applied to any facility that had operated for a long period of time before being required to do groundwater monitoring.  It  implicitly recognizes that imposing groundwater monitoring conditions  after many years of facility operation may result in immediate detection of groundwater exceedences — giving the operator little opportunity to prevent  a violation. The memo did not completely foreclose  the possibility of a civil penalty for groundwater violations at these facilities, but indicated that  DWQ  may not issue a Notice of Violation (the first step to a penalty) as long as the operator responded to state requests for assessment and clean up of any contamination.

The Sutton Plant Civil Penalty. The Sutton Plant’s wastewater system, consisting of two coal ash ponds built in 1971 and 1984, has had an NPDES  permit since 1977.    For most  of the system’s history,  the  permit only required monitoring for a  limited number of  groundwater quality parameters —  groundwater level, pH, Arsenic, Iron, Total Dissolved Solids, Chlorides and Selenium.   When DWQ renewed the Sutton Plant’s NPDES permit in 2011,  the new permit required monitoring of  additional contaminants (including boron, thallium, and manganese) under a state-approved monitoring plan designed to detect exceedences at the compliance boundary.  In March 2015,  DEQ assessed a record $25 million civil penalty for groundwater violations around the Sutton Plant. The civil penalty  covered a number of different groundwater standard violations over varying periods of time. The earliest violations identified in the assessment  document  dated back to 2009 (for boron) and 2010 (for thallium).    Most of the violations  (for iron, arsenic, selenium, manganese and total dissolved solids)  dated from 2012 or 2013. To reach the  $25 million assessment, DEQ  assessed either $1,000 or $5,000  per day (from initial detection to the assessment date) for each contaminant that exceeded state groundwater standards.

A Big — and Short-Lived — Settlement. Duke Energy  appealed the penalty and several months later  DEQ agreed to a settlement reducing the civil penalty to $7 million.  The most notable thing about the September 2015 settlement agreement was not the penalty reduction, but the fact that the settlement would have resolved all groundwater violations (known or discovered in the future) around all 14 Duke Energy coal ash impoundment sites in the state.  Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC),  on behalf of several environmental organizations, challenged the settlement agreement in court. SELC’s appeal did not contest  the penalty reduction for the Sutton violations, but argued  Administrative Law Judge Phil Berger, Jr. had no authority to approve a settlement agreement affecting issues beyond the Sutton civil penalty.  SELC particularly complained that the settlement agreement affected other coal ash enforcement cases without notice to the parties in those cases — including organizations represented by SELC.  Those enforcement cases dealt with specific actions required of Duke Energy to  address groundwater contamination around coal ash ponds at multiple sites.

Key provisions in the September 2015  DEQ-Duke Energy   settlement agreement

♦ Duke Energy agreed to pay a civil penalty  of $7 million and accelerate groundwater remediation at the Sutton, Asheville, Belews Creek and H.F. Lee plants. The settlement agreement did not set a timeline for the accelerated remediation.

♦ DEQ agreed to dismiss groundwater enforcement cases already pending in superior court related to the Sutton Plant and the Asheville Steam Station. See the SELC appeal of the settlement agreement for more on the relationship between the settlement agreement and pending enforcement cases.

♦ DEQ agreed not to issue Notices of Violation,  notices requiring assessment or remediation, civil penalty assessments or to  take any other enforcement actions against Duke Energy based on groundwater conditions “at any of the Duke Energy Sites” as long as Duke Energy complied  with requirements of the Coal Ash Management Act related to groundwater assessment, remediation and closure of the coal ash basins. Under the agreement, the “Duke Energy Sites” included all 14 coal ash sites across the state.

♦ DEQ agreed not to change groundwater monitoring conditions in existing or future NPDES permits for the coal ash ponds unless required by  court order;  a federal or state law; a rule; or in response to an immediate threat to public health.  Under the agreement, an “immediate threat to public health” had to involve something more than violation of a  health-based groundwater standard.  In effect, the settlement prevented DEQ from using its permitting authority to requiring monitoring for additional contaminants.

♦ DEQ agreed not to use groundwater monitoring data collected under either the NPDES permit conditions or under provisions in the Coal Ash Management Act for any purpose other than classification and closure of the coal ash ponds. In other words, DEQ agreed not to use groundwater monitoring data for enforcement purposes.

Reversing Direction.  In February, Superior Court Judge Paul Ridgeway held a hearing  on SELC’s objections to the Sutton settlement agreement.  Persuaded that the settlement agreement  affected the other enforcement  cases already before him,  Judge Ridgeway indicated an intent to take jurisdiction over the settlement agreement unless Judge Berger  narrowed the scope of his order in the Sutton civil penalty case.   Charlotte Business Journal has  reported  that Judge Berger later issued a revised order at the request of DEQ and Duke Energy.   According to the article, the settlement agreement between Duke Energy and DEQ did not change, but the  order  approving the settlement has been expressly limited to the Sutton civil penalty case.  (I have not been able to find the  revised order  on either the Office of Administrative Hearings  or DEQ website.)  As a result, the $7 million civil penalty now covers only  groundwater violations at the Sutton Plant.

Signs and Portents? DEQ made several unusual decisions in assessing and then settling the Sutton civil penalty case:

The  original $25 million civil penalty for the Sutton groundwater violations broke from past enforcement practices.  State programs  rarely impose daily penalties for newly discovered groundwater violations. Daily penalties are usually reserved for willful, intentional violations and for violators who  fail to quickly address contamination once it has been detected.  DEQ didn’t cite either of those aggravating factors in assessing the original $25 million Sutton penalty.  To reach the $25 million total, DEQ assessed a penalty of either $1,000 or $5,000 a day (depending on the contaminant) from the date of detection to the date of assessment.  (The contamination persists today and will until coal ash on the site has been removed, which everyone understands will require more time.)  The question is whether DEQ’s very aggressive penalty for the Sutton violations indicates a change in enforcement policy that may affect  other groundwater cases.

There doesn’t seem to be any precedent for DEQ agreeing –as it did in the original Sutton settlement — to limit its own permitting and enforcement authority to settle a civil penalty case.  State agencies often settle  civil penalty cases for a lower penalty amount. In the Sutton settlement, DEQ  also agreed not to change groundwater monitoring conditions on Duke Energy’s NPDES permits except in very narrow circumstances. Most of those circumstances required  some outside force  — federal law, a court order — to compel the change. In effect, DEQ  gave up the ability to use its permitting authority to  require monitoring for additional contaminants. The department also agreed not to issue Notices of Regulatory Requirements (orders for assessment and remediation of contamination)  or take  new enforcement actions against Duke Energy based on coal ash contamination at the 14 sites in N.C. The settlement agreement was conditioned on Duke Energy complying with provisions in the Coal Ash Management Act on  groundwater assessment and corrective action, but those requirements assume application of state groundwater regulations. It isn’t clear why DEQ would agree to give up use of normal groundwater enforcement tools like the Notice of Regulatory Requirements. Limits on DEQ use of groundwater data for enforcement purposes could have affected the state’s ability to address  groundwater problems discovered later.

What Does it Mean?  Assuming Judge Berger’s revised order has set much of the Sutton settlement agreement aside, the Sutton case is mostly  interesting as an insight into DEQ’s enforcement decision-making. It is hard to identify a consistent principle that would explain both  DEQ’s very aggressive use of civil penalty power in the first instance and DEQ’s willingness to  give up significant permitting and enforcement authority  to settle the  case. The question is whether the Sutton decisions  were peculiar to it or have broader implications.

Risk-Ranking Coal Ash Impoundments

February 12, 2016.  The 2014 Coal Ash Management Act, Session Law 2014-122 , required the Department of Environmental Quality (then the Department of Environment and Natural Resources) to propose classifications for  coal ash impoundments in the state as High, Intermediate or Low Risk. The risk classification determines both how quickly the impoundment must be closed and whether closure requires removal of the coal ash for beneficial reuse or disposal in a lined landfill. Only Low Risk impoundments can be closed by de-watering and capping the coal ash in place.  The General Assembly designated Dan River Steam Station, Riverbend, Asheville and the Sutton Plant as high risk by law;  DEQ and the Coal Ash Management Commission have responsibility for classifying the remaining 10 coal ash sites.

Statutory Criteria for Risk Classification. The law, in G.S. 130A-309.211,  listed factors to be considered in classifying the impoundments:

(1)        Any hazards to public health, safety, or welfare resulting from the impoundment.
(2)        The structural condition and hazard potential of the impoundment.
(3)        The proximity of surface waters to the impoundment and whether any surface waters are contaminated or threatened by contamination as a result of the impoundment.
(4)        Information concerning the horizontal and vertical extent of soil and groundwater contamination for all contaminants confirmed to be present in groundwater in exceedance of groundwater quality standards and all significant factors affecting contaminant transport.
(5)        The location and nature of all receptors and significant exposure pathways.
(6)        The geological and hydrogeological features influencing the movement and chemical and physical character of the contaminants.
(7)        The amount and characteristics of coal combustion residuals in the impoundment.
(8)        Whether the impoundment is located within an area subject to a 100‑year flood.
(9)        Any other factor the Department deems relevant to establishment of risk.

DEQ’s Proposed Risk Classifications. On January 29, 2016,  DEQ  released a report providing information to support proposed classifications for most coal ash impoundments.  (Several impoundments have temporary classifications pending complete information on impacts to water supply wells.)  DEQ has based its risk classifications on three “key factors” — one each for groundwater, surface water and dam safety risks:

Groundwater Risk Factor: The number of people served by water supply wells within 1500 feet and down-gradient of the impoundment’s compliance boundary that are potentially or known to be exposed to groundwater contamination related to the impoundment. DEQ used a scale based on the number of people affected by well contamination:  0 people = Low Risk; 11-20 people = Intermediate Risk and  >  30 people = High Risk.  Transitional  classifications of Low/Intermediate Risk and Intermediate/High Risk cover the gaps between the three basic categories.

Surface Water Risk Factor:   The impoundment’s location relative to the 100-year floodplain.   Impoundments located outside of the 100-year floodplain or contained by a stream valley embankment with an engineered discharge (such as a spillway) have been classified as Low Risk. Impoundments sited along the run of a river, in the floodplain, and within the 100-year flood level are classified as  High Risk.

Dam Safety:  Structural integrity and maintenance as reflected in dam safety inspections.    Impoundments that received a Notice of Deficiency  identifying non-structural deficiencies at the last dam safety inspection have been classified as Intermediate Risk.  Impoundments that received a Notice of Deficiency identifying structural deficiencies  at the last inspection have been classified as High Risk. One important note —  a number of impoundments have a High Risk dam safety rating because of structural deficiencies identified in the last inspection, but DEQ has discounted that factor in the overall facility risk rating by assuming  the impoundments will be Low Risk once the structural deficiencies has been corrected.

Other Risk Factors.  The DEQ  report describes a number of  “other considerations”  that were not given the same weight in risk classification as the key factors. “Other considerations”  for groundwater and surface water risk include significant site conditions such as:  toxicity of contaminants exceeding groundwater standards; the extent of groundwater contamination; proximity of coal ash to the water table; potential impact of groundwater contamination on surface waters; location of the impoundment in a stream or drainage way; the water quality classification and use of  nearby surface waters; and proximity to a drinking water intake.

How DEQ Arrived at Each Proposed Classification.  The exact method DEQ used to arrived at the overall classification for each site is something of a mystery.   We know the three “key factors” largely drove the classification because the report tells us that. But there is no explanation of how (or whether) DEQ also used the information on “other considerations”  or even how the three key factors were weighted.

Example: Buck Steam Station.  Looking in greater depth at the classification of  one coal ash facility  provides a little more insight into DEQ’s classification decisions. DEQ has  temporarily  given Buck Steam Station a Low-Intermediate classification until the department receives additional information on impacts to water supply wells. If no well users near Buck Steam Station are  affected  by contamination associated with the impoundments (or well users have an alternate water source),  DEQ intends to classify the Buck  impoundments as Low Risk. Well impacts will be the deciding factor in the proposed classification. Buck rated as Low Risk under the key factor for surface water impacts because the impoundments are outside the 100-year flood plain. The three impoundments at Buck rated as  High Risk for dam safety, but DEQ assumed the  impoundments would  be Low Risk once the deficiencies have been corrected.

Looking  beyond the three key factors,  however, Buck rated as  high risk on a number of other groundwater and surface water parameters including:   contaminants exceeding state groundwater standards at or beyond the compliance boundary;  proximity of coal ash to the water table;  and discharge of contaminated groundwater to surface waters. It rated Intermediate risk based on the use of adjacent surface waters (the Yadkin River has been classified for water supply) and proximity to a drinking water intake. On some other parameters related to surface water, Buck Steam Station rated as low or intermediate risk.  See pages 92-99  for the entire list of risk ratings for the Buck impoundments.

The Buck classification seems to be fairly representative. Overall,  the  “other considerations”  discussed at great length in the report are  irrelevant to DEQ’s proposed classifications.  The one exception has to do with groundwater; after focusing the “key factor” for groundwater on impacts to down-gradient water supply wells, DEQ has deferred classification of several sites to get additional information on up-gradient and side-gradient wells.   It is also unclear how DEQ weighted different risk levels for the three key factors to arrive at an overall classification.   The Cape Fear Steam Station  was ranked Low Risk for groundwater (no impacted wells); High Risk for surface water (all of the impoundments are in the 100-year floodplain); and High Risk for  half of those impoundments because of dam safety deficiencies. But the facility as a whole received a classification of Intermediate Risk.

There may be more method to the  proposed classifications than it appears. It is possible that DEQ weighted the key factors and “other considerations”  or viewed some conditions as mitigating others.  Since the report does not provide any explanation, it is difficult to know.  The Coal Ash Management Act itself did not provide any guidance on how to translate nine statutory criteria into three risk classifications. Normally, that gap would be filled through rulemaking.   In the absence of  rules (or even a clear explanation in the DEQ report), it is hard to identify  the principles underlying the classification decisions.  The approach to groundwater risk classification may be particularly controversial since an impoundment that contains a very large volume of coal ash; extends below the water table; has documented groundwater standard violations at or beyond the compliance boundary; and discharges contaminated groundwater to surface water could be classified as Low Risk as long as no existing water supply wells users are affected.

Next Steps.  DEQ has scheduled public meetings on the proposed classifications as required under the law.  Those meetings will take place in March.  The final decisions on classification will be made by the Coal Ash Management Commission.  (Assuming the Commission can be reconstituted in time; see an earlier post on the Commission’s inability to act because  appointments to the Commission violated the N.C. Constitution.)

Environmental Issues in the Courts

October 26, 2014.  Some recent state and federal court decisions dealing with   environmental controversies in North Carolina:

Cape Fear River Watch, et al v. Environmental Management Commission. An earlier post provides background on the issues in the case. In  brief,  several environmental organizations  appealed a 2012 decision by the  N.C.  Environmental Management Commission  (EMC)   interpreting state groundwater rules to give  older, unpermitted waste disposal facilities the same groundwater remediation  options available to  permitted waste disposal facilities. All of the coal ash ponds in N.C would be considered “unpermitted” waste disposal facilities and  Duke Energy intervened in the  Cape Fear River Watch case to support the EMC  decision.

In March, Superior Court Judge Paul Ridgeway reversed part of the  EMC decision. Judge Ridgeway  interpreted groundwater remediation rules to require  facilities permitted before December 30, 1983  to  immediately remove the source of any groundwater contamination.  The decision has significant implications for coal ash ponds and old, unlined landfills where the waste material disposed of in the facility often turns out to be the contamination source. Under Judge Ridgeway’s interpretation of the rules,   waste material causing groundwater contamination would have to be immediately excavated and removed.  Although state rules allow the use of other (potentially less costly) measures to control groundwater contamination,  pre-1984 ash ponds and landfills would not have any option other than removal of the waste.

Duke Energy appealed Judge Ridgeway’s  decision to the N.C. Court of Appeals.  But before the Court of Appeals could take up the case, two things happened to alter the course of the litigation.  First,  the General Assembly enacted legislation  intended to moot the  Ridgeway decision. Section 12 of Session Law 2014-122 (the Coal Ash Management Act of 2014)  amends a groundwater statute to direct the EMC to require remediation of  groundwater contamination at a waste disposal facility without regard to the date  the facility had been permitted.  Legislators acknowledged that the provision was intended to reverse  Judge  Ridgeway’s interpretation of  the groundwater  remediation rules  as applied to facilities permitted before  December 30, 1983. As a practical matter, the new law allows DENR to approve an alternative means of controlling groundwater contamination associated with a  coal ash pond or pre-1984  landfill but does not guarantee approval.

Then,  on October 10, 2014,  the N.C. Supreme Court issued an  order removing  Cape Fear River Watch v. Environmental Management Commission from the Court of Appeals docket  to  the Supreme Court docket.  The Supreme Court removed the case on its own motion, surprising the parties and their lawyers.  (The court  issued similar orders in four other civil cases at around the same time.)  The court’s action  has no recent precedent and little precedent  in the court’s history. The one-paragraph  order offered no explanation for removal of the case to the Supreme Court.  The next step in the Cape Fear River Watch case will now be the filing of briefs in the  N.C. Supreme Court.

City of Asheville v. State of N.C. and Metropolitan Sewerage District of Buncombe County.  In 2013, the General Assembly enacted a law transferring the City of Asheville’s water system to the  Metropolitan Sewerage District of Buncombe County.  Session Law 2013-50,  drafted  to apply only  to the City of Asheville water system,  had the unprecedented effect of transferring the system’s assets  (infrastructure and a 17,000 acre watershed) and debts (over $67 million in water bonds) to a new entity without the city’s consent and without compensation.  Two earlier posts, here and here, provide background on the legislative action and constitutional issues raised by the law.

In June, N.C. Superior Court Judge Howard Manning issued an order concluding that Session Law 2013-50 violated several provisions in the  N.C. Constitution. Among Judge Manning’s findings:

♦ The law violated Article II, Section 24  of the N.C. Constitution which prohibits the General Assembly from adopting  certain types of legislation  to apply in  only one jurisdiction in the state. Judge Manning concluded Session Law 2013-50 violated  constitutional  prohibitions against local acts relating to “health, sanitation or the abatement of nuisances”  and local acts regulating  nonnavigable streams.  Although  Session Law 2013-50 did not mention the City of Asheville or the  Metropolitan Sewerage District of Buncombe County  by name,  it described water systems affected by the law  in a way that only applied to the Asheville system.  As a result, Judge Manning found the law to be an unconstitutional  local act addressing  health and sanitation (operation of a drinking water system) and regulation of nonnavigable streams.

♦  The law violated Article I, Section 19 by transferring the Asheville water system to a different entity without the city’s consent and without any rational basis. Article I, Section 19, known as the “law of the land” clause of the N.C. Constitution, has been interpreted to require both due process and equal protection. Judge Manning found Session Law 2013-50 violated the clause by depriving the City of Asheville of property without any  rational basis, suggesting a due process violation and expressly finding a denial of equal protection.

♦ Other sections of  Judge Manning’s  order concluded that Session Law 2013-50 violated Article I, Section 19 and Article 1, Section 35 (a broad reservation of rights) by taking city-owned property and by doing so without providing compensation for the property.

One key to the court’s decision:  operation of a  water system is considered to be a proprietary rather than a governmental function. Proprietary functions don’t involve peculiarly governmental powers and could also be carried out by a nongovernmental entity. Other examples of proprietary functions would be  operation of an electric utility, a recreational facility  or a sports venue.   With respect to proprietary functions,  Judge Manning concluded that  local governments have  the same constitutional protection against  uncompensated taking of property as a nongovernmental entity.

Judge Manning’s order did not address the city’s argument that the law also unconstitutionally interfered with contracts between the city and bondholders.  The state, throughout the Attorney General’s Office, indicated an intent to appeal the decision to the N.C. Court of Appeals. A final decision by the appeals court would not be expected for about a year.

Erica Y. Bryant, et al v. United States, 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, October 14, 2014.  The plaintiffs  had sued the United States government seeking compensation for health problems allegedly caused by exposure to contaminated drinking water at the Camp Lejuene Marine Corps Base near Jacksonville,  North Carolina.  A recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in another North Carolina groundwater contamination case, Waldberger v.  CTS, Inc.,   held that the state’s 10-year statute of repose barred a lawsuit alleging injury and property damage caused by groundwater contamination filed more than 10 years after the  last act contributing to the contamination —  even though the plaintiffs first learned of the contamination much later.  (You can find more on the Waldberger decision in an earlier post. The same post also includes additional background on the contamination problem at Camp Lejuene.)

The N.C. General Assembly responded to the  Waldberger decision  by enacting a law excluding claims for property damage and personal injury related to contaminated groundwater from the 10-year statute of repose. See Session Law 2014-17.  The law was written to apply to both pending cases and cases filed after its enactment. In the Bryant decision, however, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the new law could not retroactively apply to pending cases. The appeals court treated the 10-year statute of repose as a sort of property interest benefitting (in this case) the U.S. government. The court ruled  that the state legislature could not retroactively remove that benefit.  The decision turned, in part, on the court’s conclusion that Session Law 2014-17 changed rather than clarified the state’s prior law.

The 11th Circuit decision seems to leave the Camp Lejeune plaintiffs without any legal remedy for long-term health effects allegedly caused by exposure to the contaminated drinking water.

N.C. Enacts Coal Ash Legislation

August 21, 2014.  After two weeks of drama in which the House and Senate had a falling out over one critical provision  and threatened to adjourn without voting on a final bill, the N.C. General Assembly enacted coal ash legislation by strong bipartisan margins in both chambers.  The  final bill now goes to Governor Pat McCrory for signature.  Senate Bill 729  follows eighteen months of controversy over the environmental impacts of the 33 coal ash impoundments located at 14  electric generating facilities  in North Carolina and the McCrory administration’s response to the problems.   Coal ash became an urgent  legislative priority after  a stormwater pipe under an  impoundment in Rockingham County ruptured and spilled more that 30,000 tons of coal ash into the Dan River. (Earlier posts on N.C. coal ash impoundments  and the Dan River spill here and here.)

What Senate Bill 729  Does:

♦ Sets timelines for  conversion from  wet to dry ash handling;  an  end to deposition of  coal combustion residuals (CCRs)  in wet impoundments; and final closure of  all 33 impoundments under  environmental standards.  Nothing in existing state or federal law otherwise requires any of those actions. Under current law, the state  can take enforcement action  to require a utility to address  unpermitted  wastewater  discharges or groundwater standard violations associated with an impoundment, but it is more difficult to effect comprehensive policy change through individual enforcement cases.

Under prior N.C. law, CCRs in a wet impoundment had been considered “wastewater residuals” and  exempt from the state’s solid waste disposal laws.  Senate Bill 729   requires CCRs removed from a wet impoundment  to be disposed of as solid waste.  Unless put to an approved reuse, the  bill requires disposal in a landfill that meets the most current standards  for  industrial landfills (including a liner system, leachate collection,  groundwater monitoring, and financial assurance).

♦  Sets  timelines for groundwater assessment and remediation  for all 33 CCR impoundments.  The state would otherwise have to seek assessment and remediation through enforcement cases. Even in response to enforcement action, existing state  rules generally allow the person (or company) responsible for the contamination to propose a schedule for assessment and remediation.

[Note:  In  litigation over  how state groundwater remediation rules apply to  pre-1984 CCR impoundments, a superior court judge recently interpreted the rules to require “immediate” removal of  coal ash causing  groundwater contamination beyond the compliance boundary. Senate Bill 729 reverses that decision;  see  “Controversies” below.]

♦ Requires the utilities to  identify drinking water wells within one-half  mile down-gradient of each CCR impoundment; test  wells potentially affected by groundwater contamination from the impoundment;  and provide  an alternative water supply if  testing finds a contaminant associated with  CCRs at levels exceeding the groundwater standard.  Under existing law, DENR can use enforcement authority to require a person responsible for groundwater contamination  to  identify and test wells for contamination.  Enforcement actions  focus on conditions at individual sites and the groundwater assessments tend to be more incremental, gradually working out from the known source of contamination and continuing  only as far as testing  shows high levels of contamination. The  comprehensive requirements of Senate Bill 729 may provide more information on well contamination more quickly.

The bill requires the utilities to provide  alternative water supply to any well owner whose drinking water well shows high levels of a contaminant associated with coal combustion residuals.  Without this kind of statutory remedy, a well owner may have to sue for damage to the water supply well — bearing both the upfront costs of  litigation and the burden of proving the impoundment caused the  well contamination. Senate Bill 729  requires  the electric utilities to provide an alternative drinking water supply within 24 hours  and alternative water supply for other purposes (such as bathing) within thirty days based  simply on data showing  that the well water exceeds the  groundwater standard for any constituent associated with CCRs.

♦ Requires the utilities to inspect all CCR impoundments;  report on all wastewater discharges (permitted and unpermitted) ;  and take action to eliminate unpermitted discharges to surface waters on a timeline set in the law. DENR has existing authority to take enforcement action in response to an unpermitted discharge of wastewater to surface waters, but would  normally have to take those actions on a site by site basis. Senate Bill 729 may prompt earlier identification and correction of the violations.

♦  Establishes stricter design, construction and siting standards for large projects  using coal ash as fill for construction projects and puts a moratorium on smaller structural fill projects. (Any project using more than 8,000 tons of coal ash per acres or more than 80,000 tons  total will be considered a “large” structural fill.) Existing  state rules  governing use of coal ash as structural fill have significant gaps. The new law fills a number of those gaps by requiring large structural fill projects to be lined;  have leachate collection systems;   monitor for groundwater impacts and provide financial assurance.  The bill also  establishes new siting criteria for large structural fills, including  setbacks from streams, wetlands, wells and property boundaries.

The bill puts a one-year moratorium on smaller structural fill projects while DENR studies  the adequacy of standards for those projects. The bill allows for two exceptions to the moratorium on small structural fills: 1. voluntary compliance with the new, stricter standards applied to large structural fill projects; or 2. use of CCRs as structural fill for a  public road  project.

Amends the state Dam Safety Act to require Emergency Action Plans for all  high or intermediate hazard dams (including CCR impoundments) and  sets specific inspection requirements for CCR impoundments.

♦ Amends water quality laws to require  earlier notice to DENR and to the public following a wastewater spill that reaches surface waters. Prior law had been unclear about notice to DENR and allowed 48 hours  for notice to the public. Senate Bill 729 requires notice to DENR as soon as practicable  (and no later than 24 hours after the spill reaches surface waters) and to notify the  public within 24 hours. The new notice requirements apply to all wastewater spills and not just those associated with CCR impoundments.

♦ Repeals  much  of a 2013 regulatory reform provision dealing with groundwater contamination. Senate Bill 729   repeals two significant parts of the 2013 law: 1. a  presumption that the groundwater compliance boundary should be at the property line;  and 2.  restrictions on  DENR’s ability to require action inside the compliance boundary to control  groundwater contamination. (See the section on groundwater legislation  in an earlier post  for  more explanation of  what the 2013 provision did and Senate Bill 729 now undoes.)

♦ Imposes a new fee on electric utilities that own CCR impoundments to support implementation of the law. The bill allocates funds for 25 new  positions in DENR to work on coal ash and 5 positions in the Department of Public Safety to support the Coal Ash Management Commission.

Weak Points:

Creating a  new Coal Ash Management Commission in the Department of Public Safety with  authority to overrule DENR decisions on prioritization of impoundments for closure and approval of closure plans — but without the expertise or staff support to make those decisions. The Department of Public Safety has no experience with implementation of state and federal environmental laws and the bill authorizes a small staff of five to support all of the commission’s activities.  Commission appointment criteria do not require any member to have expertise in  groundwater hydrology or water quality  –  likely to be critical in prioritizing sites for closure and approving closure plans.

The bill provides few guiding standards for classifying impoundments based on risk. Risk classification will be one of the most important decisions required under the law  because the classification determines whether coal ash has to be removed from the site or can potentially be capped in place. The bill lists a number of factors to be considered, but provides no guidance on how to translate the  factors into high, intermediate and low risk classifications. Existing state programs that use similar classification systems to guide remediation work  have gone through rulemaking to  adopt specific criteria for defining high, intermediate and low risk. In the absence of rulemaking, the lack of legislative guidance could lead to inconsistent and arbitrary decision-making. Senate Bill 729   identifies four sites for immediate closure and in debating the bill a number of legislators questioned  the basis for prioritizing those four over others with similar environmental problems. Those kinds of question aren’t going to go away when the prioritization process shifts over to DENR and the new commission.

The bill authorizes  the Coal Ash Management Commission to issue variances from the impoundment closure deadlines, although the final version of the bill  allows only one variance of no more than three years for an individual impoundment.

Controversies:

In debate on the final bill, Democratic lawmakers again raised concerns about  the impact on ratepayers if  utilities  try to recover assessment and cleanup costs in a rate case. Senate Bill 729 prevents  utilities from recovering costs associated with an illegal spill (like the one on the Dan River), but only puts a  brief moratorium on recovery of  costs associated with assessment, cleanup and closure of coal ash impoundments.  The moratorium ends January 15, 2015 — before the utilities are likely to have incurred significant costs.  Some  legislators  would clearly prefer to leave the cost recovery issue entirely to the N.C. Utilities Commission; others  suggested  the General Assembly will  have time to revisit the cost recovery issue next session.

A number of environmental organizations have criticized the bill for potentially allowing use of capping in place to close impoundments that have CCRs  in  close proximity to  groundwater. This  issue  nearly derailed the bill completely  as House and Senate conferees tried to reach agreement on a final bill.     Both House and Senate versions of the bill required removal of CCRs from impoundments classified as high or intermediate risk.  Although worded differently, both versions of the bill allowed low risk impoundments to be closed by dewatering the coal ash and  installing an impermeable clay cap over the ash under standards  applied to closure of solid waste landfills  — the practice known as  “capping in place”.   Neither version of the bill  addressed  the concern  that a “low risk” impoundment may  be in close proximity to groundwater, allowing  CCRs to be a continuing source of groundwater contamination even after installation of a cap.

House  members  raised the issue for the first time in conference and proposed  new language to bar  “capping in place” if any part of the impoundment was located below the seasonal high water table. See an earlier post for more on the conflict between House and Senate conferees and the cost concern in the background of  debates over capping in  place. The final bill did not include the language proposed by House conferees, but added a sentence  barring approval of  a “cap in place” closure

…unless the Department finds that the proposed closure plan includes design measures to prevent, upon the plan’s full implementation, post-closure exceedances of groundwater quality standards beyond the compliance boundary that are attributable to constituents associated with the presence of the impoundment.

The new language would allow the utilities to cap in place  CCRs  in close proximity to groundwater as long as the closure plan  includes other measures (such as engineered groundwater remediation systems) to  prevent groundwater standard violations  beyond the compliance boundary.   The language clearly does not provide as high a level of protection  as a separation between the  coal ash  and groundwater — but  would   be consistent  with existing state  rules allowing DENR to approve a groundwater remediation plan based on use of engineered systems  to treat or control the contamination source and prevent groundwater violations beyond the compliance boundary. The question may be the level of confidence in DENR’s review and approval of remediation measures and the utilities’ commitment to long-term maintenance of remediation systems.

A final (related) controversy has to do with  language in Senate Bill 729  to   overrule a recent superior court decision interpreting state groundwater rules to impose more rigid remediation requirements  on waste disposal systems permitted before 1984. An earlier  post discusses the issue and Judge Ridgeway’s decision (now on appeal to the N.C. Court of Appeals) in more detail. In brief, the judge interpreted  state rules to require  immediate removal of the contamination source at any pre-1984 waste disposal site where contamination has caused a exceedance of a groundwater standard beyond the compliance boundary.   At a waste disposal facility, the contamination source usually turns out to be the waste disposed of in the facility  — which  could  be garbage  put in  a landfill or coal ash placed in an impoundment. The judge’s interpretation does not allow the alternative of using engineered groundwater remediation systems to treat or control the source of contamination at these older facilities — something the rules  allow for newer  facilities.

Senate Bill 729 reverses the effect of Judge Ridgeway’s decision by requiring groundwater remediation rules to be applied consistently to all waste disposal facilities without regard to the date of permitting.  Legislative intervention  seemed to be driven  by  some combination of concern about completely foreclosing the possibility of capping coal ash in place  and the impact of the decision on county and municipal waste disposal sites permitted before 1984.

The bill now sits  on the Governor’s desk, waiting for signature or veto.